Science Development by Qian, Wen-Yuan
377
Logical and historical arguments are offered to prove that the following hypothesis is
invalid: Given that in medieval China the study of magnetism had reached an advanced
level, if it had had the sociohistorical condition to develop modern science, then China
might have developed "field physics" (of electromagnetism) first and bypassed the
Newtonian "billiard-ball physics.
" The fallacy of this hypothesis serves us as the start-
ing point of developing some profound ideas&mdash;that is, those related to the evolutionary






It had to go that way, if Herr Forster knew anything about composition.
-Ludwig von Beethoven
No one denies that science has become one of the most precious
common properties of all rational human beings. Even historically,
the growth of science was not just a &dquo;European miracle&dquo;: There were
the Greek miracle, the Chinese miracles (an early one in the Warring
States, the fourth and third centuries B.C., another in the Northern
Song Dynasty, the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D.), the Arabic
miracle, and the Western European miracle. However, owing to their
great disparity in stature, some historians think, with cogent reasons,
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that only the ancient Greek miracle and the post-Renaissance Western
miracle, or only the last one, were true scientific &dquo;miracles.&dquo; In this
article I am talking about the growth of modern science-more
specifically, modern physical, exact, and quantitative sciences
(mathematics, physics, chemistry, biological taxonomy, anatomy,
bacteriology, immunology, and so on).
Historical scholarship has recently discovered that a comparative
study of historic phenomena that engendered or hindered the growth
of modern science in China is a rich field of theoretical interest. Such
study began with an inquiry into the causes that delayed the develop-
ment of modern science in China. According to the Needham school,
medieval China verged upon generating modern science autonomous-
ly. To many, especially Chinese scholars (Ren, 1915; Feng, 1922; He,
1983; Qian, 1983), an immediate question arises: Is this a justifiable
statement? A careful study of this question naturally leads to a series
of comparative pursuits, mainly Sino-Western, both in sociopolitical
development and in the evolution (and revolutions) of physical
sciences in particular.
The all-inclusive, almost banal, yet always unavoidable pair of
questions are, What are the decisive factors that made the European
&dquo;miracle&dquo; possible? and, What are the decisive factors that made a
Chinese &dquo;miracle&dquo; impossible? In this article I will outline a
theoretical answer to these two questions. But before that a number of
preparatory concepts should be clarified and some questions
answered. In this way I will summarize my theoretical conclusions
reached as the result of a comparative study. Let me start with one im-
portant aspect of the history of science, an aspect which, I believe, has
not yet received adequate attention. It can be called, for lack of a bet-
ter phrase, the scientific character of science. For us, the significance
of the scientific character of science is that it lends &dquo;uniqueness&dquo; or
&dquo;determinism&dquo; to the historic development of science itself.
The words &dquo;uniqueness&dquo; and &dquo;determinism&dquo; are in quotation
marks because they are not literally true. At any time there coexist dif-
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ferent sets of sciences; like everything, the &dquo;uniqueness&dquo; of science is
relative. If we look at a wide spectrum of rational inquiries, institutions,
and cultures, science is distinguished by its &dquo;immediate&dquo; demand of
empirical verifiability and/or rigorous logic. (There is no question that
the idea of science develops and crystallizes in the course of history, and
so does the recognition of this immediate requirement.) Since empirical
verification and/ or rigorous logic eliminate in principle all but one
possibility, one may call the scientific character of science &dquo;the criterion
of scientific uniqueness.&dquo;
In ordinary parlance we contrast &dquo;hard science&dquo; with social
science. Economics is the &dquo;hardest&dquo; among the social sciences, yet it is
still so &dquo;soft&dquo; that it allows different schools to debate at the level of
daily talk. (By the way, I am confident that economics is being
&dquo;hardened.&dquo; Michaelson, my friend, remarked that what
distinguishes hard sciences from social sciences is a shared expectation
that in the former eventually a consensus will be reached. In the social
sciences the same contending theories, perhaps somewhat modified,
persist for centuries without either a synthesis or a triumph of one of
them to produce consensus. What I want to add is that the shared ex-
pectation is based on historical experiences, in which the success of
classical and modern physics played no small part.) According to the
&dquo;uniqueness&dquo; criterion, different fields in exact or &dquo;hard&dquo; science can
also be sorted by their degree of &dquo;uniqueness.&dquo; There were only a few
contending physical theories in each branch of physical phenomena
before classical physics established a unifying theory in a classic man-
ner ; but in life and geological sciences, contending theories coexisted.
(Indeed some are mandated on an equal-time basis by American law in
a few states.) On &dquo;uniqueness&dquo; among exact sciences, Michaleson
comments that the eliminative capability of empirical verification
and/or rigorous logic should not be exaggerated even in the exact
sciences. For instance, by this criterion for many decades theoretical
astrophysics and theoretical particle physics were &dquo;soft&dquo; sciences. I
agree with this point for developing sciences; on the other hand, I am
confident about the applicability of the criterion in evaluating a longer
period of the history of science.
In my judgment, the extent of success or failure (largely, failure) of
the Marxian deterministic theory of social history is a result of two
related macrohistorical facts: (1) Economic activities do not proceed
in a unique manner-they are too much influenced by local natural
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conditions, cultural history, and current politics; and (2) politics
depends too much on individual will and influence. (Consequently,
economics lacks &dquo;uniqueness,&dquo; or academic authoritativeness.)
I realized this criterion because in an authoritative book on the
history of Chinese physics I was confronted with an explicit proposi-
tion that physics might have developed completely differently.
Therefore, in a sense, I was forced to pick up the gauntlet-because I am
a Chinese physicist. Nations may learn and follow science along sundry
paths but positive scientific results acquired by scientific pathbreakers
usually grow in a step-by-step manner. Fact-finding may be fortuitous
and theoretical imagination idiosyncratic, but in building the edifice of
science it ought to be the paramount concern of every scientific worker
to try to fit every piece-an experimental effect or a logical link-into its
proper place. There is no predetermined blueprint, but an unyielding
rationalism guides the arduous solving of a gigantic jigsaw puzzle.
Therefore, myriad political and educational activities the world
over do not invalidate the significance of the criterion, especially its
historical significance. We are tackling the comparative history of
science. On a phenomenological level we want to know: To what stage
has science developed in a nation at a certain period? How much
potential for developing modern science was there in a traditional
society? For these and other related questions, this criterion of scien-
tific &dquo;uniqueness&dquo; finds its meaningful applications. It was a passage
on the first page of the volume that Needham devoted to Chinese
physics (1962:1) that I found most challenging:
Most important in this section will be, of course, the development of
knowledge about magnetism, in particular the discovery and exploita-
tion of the directive property of the lodestone. The Chinese were so
much in advance of the Western world in this matter that we might
almost venture the speculation that if the social conditions had been
favourable for the development of modern science, the Chinese might
have pushed ahead first in the study of magnetism and electricity, pass-
ing to field physics without going through the stage of &dquo;billiard-ball&dquo;
physics. Had the Renaissance been Chinese and not European, the
whole sequence of discoveries would probably have been entirely
different.
Of course we noticed his apologetic tone in the wording of &dquo;might
almost venture.&dquo; But we should not dismiss this passage as insignifi-
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cant. Because it is a stimulating hypothesis-why not examine it
carefully? Moreover, in numerous passages in his books Needham
(wrongly) ridicules &dquo;billiard-ball&dquo; physics, and he (wrongly) pits field
physics against billiard-ball physics. For Needham, therefore, to
bypass billiard-ball physics and to establish field physics directly is a
rational reconstruction of historic development, not just a turn of
whim. Besides, he thinks (wrongly) that the &dquo;replacement&dquo; of
billiard-ball physics by field physics testifies to the victory of the
organicist philosophy, which, according to him, is &dquo;rectifying&dquo; the
mechanistic philosophy. He eulogizes the ancient Chinese proto-
scientific thought, naming it &dquo;Chinese correlativism,&dquo; and assumes
that it will be &dquo;valuable for the future history of human thought,&dquo;
&dquo;essential for the construction of modern science in its present and
coming form,&dquo; because &dquo;natural science could not perfect itself
without the characteristic philosophy of Chinese civilization&dquo;
(Needham, 1956: 288, 339, 340). I will disclose Needham’s
misunderstanding of physics later. Indeed it was at once a shocking
and revealing experience to find myself at odds with Needham on
historical interpretation, physical understanding, and philosophical
belief.
As I said before, different branches of science differ in their degree
of uniqueness, and we should expect that physics, and mechanics in
particular, exhibit a desirable degree of uniqueness. Historically
mechanics was the first field of physics theorized. We acclaim
Newton’s achievements as the culmination of the Scientific Revolu-
tion because he explained a wide range of mechanical phenomena with
a small bundle of axioms, or he carried out axiomatization. His
methodological predecessors were Euclid and Descartes. His work
itself set a model for all other branches of physics. Both pre- and post-
Newton history of mechanics convince us that except in details
mechanics could not have developed differently from its actual
history. The post-Newton history illustrates the situation clearly.
From the publication of the Principia in 1687 to 1905, the year that
saw the publication of Einstein’s special relativity, which changes the
Newtonian concepts of space and time, all European mathematical
geniuses could only reformulate Newton’s system in different forms
but not in essence. Owing to conceptual and mathematical difficulties,
and the reliance upon a mature electrodynamics, it is simply in-
conceivable that special relativity-that is, another axiomatized
system that deals successfully with mechanical locomotions-would
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have emerged before the Newtonian system. This historic inexorability
is exactly what we mean by uniqueness of historic development.
In the early history of mechanics there was much less uniqueness in
theoretical explanations. But the Newtonian unification rendered ob-
solete all contending theories. Similarly, in the development of elec-
tricity and magnetism, there appeared several different theories, one
after another or contemporaneously. The situation was less messy in
optical history, where there were basically two competing theories,
corpuscular versus oscillatory. Finally by the end of the last century,
classical physics succeeded in explaining the whole range of physical
phenomena with a beautifully unified system.
Could electromagnetism have appeared ahead of mechanics as a
mathematically axiomatized system? In actual history there was a two-
hundred-year gap between the publication of the Principia and James
Maxwell’s Electricity and Magnetism. To every sober physicist the
assumption of a reversed order of the establishment of these two
theoretical systems of physical phenomena would be tantamount to
admitting that it is a logical, or economical, or historical way of doing
things by starting from a certain upper story to build a multistory
building.
Apart from this logical mistake, the Needhamite hypothesis also
blunders for obvious historical reasons. He speculates that with an ad-
vanced level of the science of magnetism, alongside social conditions
favorable for the development of modern science, most probably
(allowing Needham’s apologetic tone) electromagnetism would have
emerged without any aid from billiard-ball mechanics. To illustrate
&dquo;favorable social conditions&dquo; he promptly uses the Renaissance as an
example. But when Needham was saying all this he apparently forgot
William Gilbert, his compatriot, who published a milestone book, De
magnete, in 1600. There is no question that Gilbertian magnetism was
much richer, more systematic, and intellectually more stimulating
than the sum total of the contemporary Chinese knowledge on
magnetism. Gilbert was a late Renaissance man-there is no question
about this either. Since about 1600, in less than a century modern
science grew rapidly in Western Europe and in England in particular.
So, according to Needham’s logic, the leading field of this modern
science should be electromagnetism. But that is not the actual history.
In bringing both mechanics and electromagnetism to fruition England
played a vital role. It seems that Needham had also forgotten several
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other English scientists and their major contributions, which can be
shown schematically in a double series:
The failure of Needham’s hypothesis to conform to actual history
accentuates the inexorability of the actual historic path of physics,
which, according to our uniqueness idea, is deterministic in the
basically ordered accumulation of scientific contents. With this
criterion of the historic development of physics, and mechanics in par-
ticular, we can evaluate the corresponding situation in traditional
China with great perspicacity.
Observations on mechanical phenomena began very early in China.
Significant observations belong to two groups, one about buoyancy
and the other about the lever. In ancient Greece, Archimedes scien-
tifically summarized these two groups of observations into his two
great principles. Therefore, we see a general Sino-Greek conformity
with regard to basic mechanical phenomena that deservedly attracted
scholarly attention, a conformity that supports our idea of scientific
&dquo;uniqueness.&dquo; But in China, as we will explain, these preliminary
observations stayed in a scientifically rudimentary stage for more than
2000 years.
As early as in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., Mo Ti, the author
of the Mohist Canon, formulated his observation on the lever correct-
ly, although his was still not a general and quantitative principle
(Needham, 1962: 22):
As for the steelyard, let a quantity of material and a weight be balanced,
the distance between the fulcrum and the point where the material is
suspended being shorter than the distance between the fulcrum and the
point where the weight is suspended. This will then be the longer. If now
to both sides the same weight is added, the weight must go down.
From time immemorial the Chinese steelyard had been made accor-
ding to a general quantitative principle: When a lever is in balance, the
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product of a weight on the other side and its distance from the fulcrum
equals the product of a weight on the other side and its distance from
the fulcrum. But it seems that the best Chinese formulation that ap-
proached this Archimedes principle was that ancient Mohist one
quoted above. One of China’s greatest misfortunes was that
historically the Mohist and other non-Confucian schools (the
Legalists, the Logicians, etc.) were officially banned by two early cam-
paigns, one around 220 B.C. (rather indiscriminatingly), and the other
in the first century B.C. These institutional developments were, in my
judgment, primarily responsible for the ensuing nondevelopment in
scientific formulation in China. These were vitally important, because
science means and deposits its power in axiomatic comprehension.
Three centuries after Mo Ti, a Han prince, Liu An, sponsored an
encyclopedic work, Huai Nan Zi, which contains the following
passage (Needham, 1962: 23):
Therefore if one has the benefit of &dquo;position,&dquo; a very small grasp can
support a very large thing. That which is small but essential can control
that which is wide and broad. So a beam only 10 wei long can support a
house l000jun in weight; a hinge only 5 inches in length can control the
opening and closing of a large gate. It does not matter whether the
material is large or small. What matters is its exact position.
Needham thinks that this last passage indicates &dquo;a wide understand-
ing&dquo; of &dquo;the whole theory of equilibria as stated by Archimedes.&dquo; But
this seems to be a doubtful contention. Just compare these two
passages, one from Mo Ti and the other from Liu An: the latter is
scientifically a retrogression, although rhetorically superior. The
Mohist text strove to be general and quantitative, whereas by the
wording of the Huai Nan Zi passage we do not even know the relative
configuration of the beam and the house, or of the &dquo;5 inch hinge&dquo; and
the &dquo;large gate.&dquo;
Next the question of buoyancy. A recent Chinese paper (Dai, 1980)
explained two very terse passages-one comprises ten Han characters,
another seventeen-in the Mohist Canon and ascertained that they
were about buoyancy and &dquo;conform to Archimedes’ principle of
floating bodies which was discovered later.&dquo; One passage says, &dquo;An
object of big body floats high on water. It is explained by
equilibrium.&dquo; Another says, &dquo;There is an equilibrium between the
385
body and its submerged part. It is as if there is a five to one
exchange.&dquo; Later, in the Eastern Han Dynasty there was the famous
episode of &dquo;Cao Chong weighing an elephant&dquo;: The almighty prime
minister Cao Cao was curious about the weight of an elephant. No
one could tell. His son Cao Chong stepped forward and said, &dquo;That’s
not hard. Lead the elephant into a boat and mark how deep the boat
sinks. Then instead of the elephant put in heavy rocks until the boat
sinks to the same mark. The total weight of the rocks is what you want
to know.&dquo; We will analyze how near this formulation is to (or how far
away from) Archimedes’ principle of buoyancy.
Somewhat earlier than Cao Chong, also in the Han, occurs an in-
teresting passage about the operation of a group of technicians who
produced standard capacity, or volume (Needham, 1962: 39):
The workers ... make measures of capacity. They purify by successive
heating samples of metal (presumably copper) and tin, until there is no
further loss of weight. Then they weigh them.
Biot translated what follows: &dquo;After they have weighed them, they
proportionalize (or equalize) them, and after that they measure them&dquo;
(Needham, 1962: 40).
Now Needham points out (1962: 40) that &dquo;Jiang Yong, however,
had already suggested at the end of the eighteenth century&dquo; that the
second action, the one translated by Biot as &dquo;proportionalizing,&dquo; had
meant in the Han era &dquo;weighing in water.&dquo; By this explanation
Needham states, &dquo;What the Han technicians were doing, therefore,
was essentially what Archimedes did, namely to ascertain the propor-
tions of an alloy by weighing in water as well as in air.&dquo; Then he con-
cludes : &dquo;Such an interpretation makes much more sense than Biot’s.&dquo;
It is, however, easy to see that we can follow either Biot’s translation
or Jiang Yong’s explanation, but neither will lead us to Needham’s
conclusion. Many present-day Chinese, including me, would have
agreed with Biot before they learned about Jiang Yong. Since we are
now informed about his interpretation of the character &dquo;zhun,&dquo; let us
follow him and examine Needham’s logic.
First we notice that Archimedes could solve his question for two
reasons. For one, he was a good mathematician. In order to fulfill the
task assigned to him by King Hieron, Archimedes did not have to
know &dquo;the Archimedes principle of buoyancy.&dquo; What he needed to
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know was the volume of the crown, which could be measured by
displaced water. (Therefore, taking a bath in a tub was indeed crucial
to Archimedes’ &dquo;Eureka. &dquo;) On the other hand, with the aid of his
principle, which asserts that the loss of weight of a body in a liquid
equals the weight of the liquid which is displaced, the volume of the
crown easily could be determined by weighing the crown in and out of
water. Second, Archimedes knew that there were at most two com-
ponents in the alloy. If there had been three or more components, he
could have only affirmed whether there was adulteration or not, but
he could not have ascertained the composition quantitatively. A set of
two equations with more than two variables has an infinite set of solu-
tions.
In the above quoted Chinese passage, obviously it was Needham
who inserted &dquo;(presumably copper)&dquo; after the word &dquo;metal.&dquo; If the
Han technicians were interested in the compositional problem, they
should be more specific about the &dquo;metal.&dquo; And if there were more
than two metals in an alloy, ascertaining its composition was simply
impossible by weighing the resultant weights (in and out of water) or
measuring the resultant volume.
The first part of the quotation tells us that those technicians were
producing standard capacity (volume). For this purpose, what is the
point of knowing the compostion of the alloy? From the second part
of the quotation, according to Jiang Yong’s explanation, what might
be inferred is that the Han technicians mastered the Archimedes prin-
ciple to the extent-still far from an exact and full formulation of the
pinciple-that if the weights weighed the same in the air, and assum-
ing they were of the same alloy compositions (&dquo;successive heating ...
until there is no further loss of weight&dquo;), then they have the same
capacity if they also weighed the same in water-consistent with their
purpose of making standard capacity.
Apparently, I am not the only person to have noticed that Needham
is sometimes inclined to overextend his extrapolations. Francis Hsu
observed (1970: 371-372) that equal temperament &dquo;is commonly
credited to the European Andreas Werkmesiter. But Needham after
considering all sorts of evidence, infers that an independent invention
of equal temperament in Europe is most unlikely.&dquo; In Needham’s own
words:
In any case it is fair to say that the European and modern music of the
last three centuries may well have been powerfully influenced by a
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masterpiece of Chinese mathematics, though proof of transmission is
not yet available.
In Needham’s works one finds that he likes to repeat his unsubstan-
tiated contentions again and again. In a recent book David Landes
writes (1983: 20-23):
Now this is optative history, the story of what should have been. There
is, as Needham concedes, no evidence whatsoever linking the two
horological tradtions. There is not even a bond of logic or method be-
tween them.
In any event, neither the systemic differences nor the absence of cor-
roborating evidence discouraged Needham. Using a post hoc, ergo
propter hoc reasoning, he speculated that rumors of the Su Song clock
somehow filtered westward over a period of a hundred or more years
and struck a spark.
Landes helps us &dquo;to understand this figment, one has to place it in
the larger context of Needham’s philosophy of history ... what he
calls ecumenical science.&dquo; Finally let me quote Landes some more
to conclude this insertional critique of Needham’s manner of
argument:
This [the &dquo;ecumenical science&dquo;] is a noble credo, but it should not be
allowed to get in the way of historical accuracy ... Joseph Needham is
too great a scholar not to be taken seriously, but what does one do when
his wishes become affirmation? Carlo Cipolla sees all this as fancy. I
agree with him.
If the Han hydrostatics really attained the sophistication of using
Archimedes’ principle to ascertain the composition of a two-
component alloy, then the concept of specific gravity should have
been familiar to Han technicians and interested scholars. Yet it seems
that written references to specific gravity or density in Chinese history
were rare. Needham, however, believes that the &dquo;general idea of
specific gravity must have existed from time immemorial.&dquo; His reason
(Needham, 1962: 39): &dquo;Mencius [fourth century] remarked that gold
was heavier than feathers, otherwise how could it be said that a hook
of gold was heavier than a cartload of feathers?&dquo; (Here we meet
another example of Needham’s method that justifies the critique
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shared by Landes, Hsu, and me.) After fifteen centuries, some written
records that had something to do with the specific gravity or density of
liquids emerged. The topic was the test of brine density, and the
favorite testing probe was lotus seeds. Late in the eleventh century
Yao Kuan wrote (Needham, 1962: 42):
Everyday I tested the brine with lotus seeds. The heavier ones were
selected for use. If brine can float 3 or 4 seeds (out of 10) it is considered
strong brine. If it floats 5 (out of 10) it is the strongest. The seeds which
float perpendicularly are preferred. If only 2 seeds float perpendicular-
ly, or 1 perpendicularly and 1 horizontally, then the brine is considered
thin and poor.
If all groups of 10 lotus seeds thus selected were identical statistical
samplings (in terms of the specific gravity of seeds-a rough, rule of
thumb hypothesis), the number of floats could show the specific gravi-
ty of the brine. But what had the specific gravity of brine to do with
floating a lotus seed perpendicularly or horizonally? Indeed this whole
device sounds more like a test of lotus seeds than of brine. There is
definitely no science here, and if it is viewed as a technology, it is a
false technology. But Chinese stagnation in mechanical science is
featured more saliently by what Needham further tells us (1962: 42):
Brine-testing methods of this kind are often afterwards referred to, with
variations, as in the mid-12th-century Neng Gai Zhai Man Lu of Wu
Cheng. And they have continued in use down to our own time.
In order to reach a general principle about weight reduction of an
immersed body, Cao Chong’s episode could serve as a propitious
starting point. But several more steps-by no means easy ones-are
needed. First, it should be decided that the weight of the water displac-
ed by the elephant is equal (not just proportional) to the weight of the
elephant. Then the procedure of weighing an elephant with a floating
boat should be formulated in abstract terms: The total weight of a
floating boat and the things in it is balanced by replacing an amount
of water of equal weight. But a floating body is not an immersed
body. Therefore, empirical knowledge on the latter was needed; ac-
cording to Needham, the Chinese were familiar with it. But
Needham’s assertion is based on inconclusive and, indeed, very
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dubious explanations of what some Han technicians were doing. Next
a general formulation of what is now accepted as the Archimedes’
principle would be needed.
Finally, the principle should be explained theoretically-that is, in
terms of hydrostatic pressure, a step that was accomplished before the
middle of the seventeenth century in Western Europe. In other words,
if Chinese hydrostatic development were to contribute to the
&dquo;mechanical revolution, &dquo;-that is, to catch up with Western develop-
ment up to the eve of the Newtonian culmination-it required (1) a
general formulation about a floating body, (2) a general formulation
about an immersed body, and (3) an explanation that unifies these and
other hydrostatic facts. It is now clear that even with the most
favorable interpretation of the practice of Han technicians, the actual
Chinese situation in this respect can only be described as empiricist
and underdeveloped, and it remained so for a long time.
While reviewing Needham’s work, I found that my idea of Chinese
inertia resonated unexpectedly with a notion that emerged in a dif-
ferent context. David Joravsky criticized Paul Feyerabend for praising
the Maoist sponsorship of traditional Chinese medicine while keeping
silent about its obvious follies. In order to illustrate some &dquo;critical
questions&dquo; Joravsky (1979) used the case of &dquo;tadpole contraceptive&dquo;:
That rude defeat of belief by collision with physical reality raises critical
questions.... Was there some dreamy quality in the traditional Chinese
mentality that permitted a persistent belief in a contraceptive method
which could so easily be proved ineffective? And is there some harsher
quality in the mentality of scientific physicians, some dream-destroying
method, which persistently brings them closer than traditional rivals to
objective tests of truth?
Have we not seen clearly this &dquo;dreamy quality in the traditional
Chinese mentality&dquo; in the recognition of facts and principles about
buoyancy? The situations are not exactly equivalent, because in the
mechanical context some ideas were correct (such as Cao’s weighing
the elephant), some partly incorrect (such as testing the specific gravi-
ty of brine with lotus seeds). But, in the case of correct knowledge, no
one bothered to generalize it. In the case of incorrect understanding,
no one tested and criticized it. Anyone who has had direct contact
with unlettered or little-educated Chinese peasantry knows that their
390
major intellectual interest is to carry on with some old hearsays rather
than to carry out experiments. This, I believe, is a universal mentality,
which might be labeled &dquo;traditionalist.&dquo; When Galileo carried two
different weights to mount the Leaning Tower at Pisa-no matter
whether the story was literally true or not-he behaved as a revolu-
tionary. Somewhat later, in China, as Nathan Sivin (1982) tells us,
when Wang Xi-chan, Mei Wen-ding, and Xue Feng-zo studied Jesuit
planetary astronomy with a critical and creative attitude (Sivin, 1970b:
160), they also behaved as revolutionaries, although that does not
mean that a &dquo;scientific revolution&dquo; occurred then in China.
If we take a bird’s-eye view of the history of classical mechanics, we
see clearly that its foundations were laid in three stages. The two Ar-
chimedes principles accomplished the first stage. Galileo’s elucidation
of a number of terrestrial gravity theorems and Kepler’s three
theorems of planetary movements fulfilled the second stage. Finally
Newton’s grasp of both terrestrial and celestial mechanical
phenomena completed the historic mission that set a methodological
paragon for other sciences. With this three-stage criterion we see that
Chinese proto-mechanics reached a half-stage in approaching the
phenomenological truth about buoyancy and the lever. Chinese scien-
tists did almost nothing pertinent to the second stage of mechanical
development, because Chinese astronomy was either too practical
(calendrical) or overly disposed to note abnormalities (yi-xiang). A
traditional astronomy that could not conceptually isolate our
planetary solar system, can indeed boast very little. About Chinese
planetary (or &dquo;explanatory&dquo;) astronomy Needham writes (1962: 399):
In spite of so much accurate observation, Chinese study of planetary
motion remained purely non-representational in character. Unlike that
of the Greeks, in which the geometry of circles and curves was so promi-
nent, it perpetuated the algebraic treatment of the Babylonian
astronomers such an Naburiannu and Kidinnu, and never sought a
geometrical theory of planetary motions.
In his biography of Shen Kua, Nathan Sivin (1970a: 375) writes about
the same problem:
Prior to Shen’s time little effort had gone into predicting the apparent
motions of the planets, which lacked the immediacy of solar and lunar
phenomena. This was, in fact, an omission that Shen seems to have been
the first to confront.
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Shen Kua was an eleventh-century polymath who once headed the
Astronomical Bureau of the Northern Song Dynasty. The plan with
which he and his collaborator Wei wanted to confront planetary
astronomy was &dquo;exact coordinates read three times a night for five
years.&dquo; But owing to the &dquo;antagonism within the Bureau,&dquo; such a
plan could not be carried out. Consequently, &dquo;Shen and Wei had no
recourse but to produce a conventional planetary theory based mainly
on old observations&dquo; (Sivin, 1970a: 378).
For the major features of the subsequent development, let us quote
Sivin again:
Very gradually from the Yuan period (1279-1368), it came to be little
practiced outside the Astronomical Bureau, which was dominated by
foreign technicians. By 1600 no one was able fully to comprehend the
old numerical equations of higher-order, prototrigonometric approx-
imations, applications of the method of finite differences, and other
sophisticated techniques.
Then came the age of Wang Xi-chan (Hsi-shan, 1628-1682), a hitherto
comparatively obscure astronomer, but for recent sinophile
revisionists one of the leading figures of the &dquo;Chinese scientific
revolution&dquo; in the seventeenth century (Sivin, 1982: 62):
Wang, Mei Wen-ding, and Xue Feng-zo were the first scholars in China
to respond to the new exact science and to shape their influence on their
successors. They were, in short, responsible for a scientific revolution.
They radically reoriented the sense of how one goes about comprehend-
ing the celestial motions.
The general attainments of this scientific revolution are reflected on
the one hand by a conjectural remark by Xi Ze-zong (Sivin, 1970b:
160):
We can imagine, if Wang Xi-chan had only come upon Copernicus’ De
revolutionibus, Galileo’s Dialogue, and Kepler’s Epitone astronomiae
Copernicanae (all of which the missionaries kept for their private use in
Peking), how much greater his contribution to astronomy would have
been
and on the other hand by the actual scientific performance (sorry, but
&dquo;shabby&dquo; is the only word that occurs to me) in China during the past
three centuries.
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Since the 1960s &dquo;scientific revolutions&dquo; have proliferated in
historiography. But I think the majority of these &dquo;revolutions&dquo; can
better be called scientific crises that led to breakthroughs. Although
Copernicus’ great work is titled De revolutionibus, the seventeenth-
century Scientific Revolution has been defined, with a different mean-
ing for the word &dquo;revolution,&dquo; as a sociohistorical movement com-
parable to or greater than the Renaissance and the Reformation that
preceded it and the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution that
followed it. So long as the alleged seventeenth-century Chinese &dquo;scien-
tific revolution&dquo; was minute in both scope and depth, and in its
sociohistoric impact, why call it so?
Nevertheless this episode may help us to illuminate some interesting
points. Wang, Mei, and Xue’s mastery of Western astronomy and
calendrical knowhow, though brilliant, fell in a specialized realm. In a
sense, their works embodied and anticipated the late nineteenth-
century policy, or topic of debate: &dquo;Chinese learning is our substance;
take Western learning as applications.&dquo; Traditional China had always
demanded a sophisticated calendrical science, and since the thirteenth
century, employing foreign experts (Indians and Arabs) had probably
been an uninterrupted tradition. Jesuit astronomers and their Chinese
acolytes continued that tradition, which had never posed a threat to
the &dquo;Chinese substance.&dquo; A few generations before Wang, Mei, and
Xue, Matteo Ricci’s close collaborator, Xu Guang-qi, said: &dquo;Let us
melt their (Western) material, and cast them into the mould of the
traditional calendar&dquo; (Nakayama, 1973a: 132). Mei Wen-ding’s false
claim that the Westerners had learned Chinese mathematics sometime
in high antiquity also reflects, in a way, the zeal to protect Chinese
centralism, and ideologically, the &dquo;Chinese substance.&dquo;
With regard to the macrohistoric pace of progress, one of my com-
parative insights is that &dquo;software decides.&dquo; Three and a half cen-
turies ago Francis Bacon eloquently stated that printing, gunpowder,
and the magnetic compass had, more than anything else, given im-
petus to historic progress. Western historians after Bacon were sur-
prised to realize that all three inventions might have originated in
China. In this century another Englishman, Joseph Needham,
declared (1969: 11) that for &dquo;not only the three which Lord Bacon
listed ... but a hundred others-mechanical clockwork, the casting of
iron, stirrups and efficient horse-harness&dquo; China enjoys the priority
of invention. Equipped with these historiographical discoveries,
Needham says (1969: 154), &dquo;the more you know about Chinese
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civilization, the more odd it seems that modern science and technology
did not develop there.&dquo; Needham identifies (1969: 154) this question
as &dquo;one of the greatest problems in the history of culture and civiliza-
tion-namely, the great problem of why modern science and
technology developed in Europe and not in Asia.&dquo; But as a Chinese
reader I was very puzzled by this &dquo;Needham Puzzle.&dquo; According to
the general condition of China, past and present, had my ancestors
come to the brink of generating modern science autonomously? My
research into this question led to a flatly negative answer. Then I was
confronted with another question: If traditional China enjoyed inven-
tive priority for all those one hundred and more technologies, why did
modern science not emerge in China? My conclusion was, and is, that
those technologies are &dquo;hardware,&dquo; whereas the decisive factors are
&dquo;software&dquo;-dominant ideologies and politico-social institutions.
By logical inference, ironically the allegation of a &dquo;Chinese scien-
tific revolution&dquo; supports our theorem that &dquo;software decides.&dquo; The
supposed Chinese seventeenth-century revolution made nothing truly
different, except perhaps in a very small professional circle and for
only a short period of time. (From the fact that since the 1920s leading
astronomers at Chinese observatories have all been returned students
from the West may I infer that there had not been a modernized
Chinese astronomy in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries China?) In
the wording of the nineteenth-century Chinese policy, the
&dquo;substance&dquo; is our &dquo;software,&dquo; and &dquo;applications&dquo; are our &dquo;hard-
ware.&dquo; If some items of &dquo;hardware&dquo; were modernized, or &dquo;revolu-
tionalized,&dquo; or more frankly Westernized, so long as the
&dquo;substance&dquo;-that is, &dquo;software,&dquo; remained unchanged the country
was still its old self: Its general scientific condition could hardly be
described as modernized. This was especially true in the past.
Nowadays the basic domestic strategy of totalitarian nations is to keep
their &dquo;substance&dquo;-their political institutions tightly combined with
ideological controls-unchanged while trying hard to modernize their
whole range of &dquo;hardware.&dquo; Science does not grow wholesomely
under totalitarian rule.
That &dquo;software decides&dquo; is one of my axioms. In explaining the
history of mechanics, I stressed the three-stage &dquo;axiomatization&dquo; of
of mechanical phenomena. By axiomatization I mean unified
understanding through comprehensive principles. If we put ancient
mechanical scientists in series such as Archimedes-Pascal-Newton,
Aristotle-Stevin-Galileo-Newton, Ptolemy-Copernicus-Tycho, Brahe-
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Kepler-Newton, we observe that one unified a wider range of
mechanical phenomena than the one before him and the upshot was a
small bundle of axioms-not necessarily self-evident, but very fertile
to produce theoretical derivatives and very sturdy to withstand em-
pirical and logical tests. In the realm of social studies, all post-Newton
thinkers were influenced in varying degrees by Newton’s (or
Descartes’, or Euclid’s) axiomatic methodology. Jeremy Bentham
proposed his Utilitarian Principle as the correct basis for understand-
ing and guiding social phenomena; Adam Smith summarized the divi-
sion of labor, laissez-faire, and so on. By citing these names I do not
mean to propose exact axiomatization in sociohistorical study. The
differences between physical and social phenomena are just too big;
the former are characterized by mathematical determinism (here,
philosophically, quantum-mechanical probabilistic laws included),
and the latter are too much mixed with human free will, cultural
history, and current conditions. On the other hand, as evidenced in
history, the axiomatic line of thinking in social sciences may help us to
identify some macrohistorical and hence significant causes and
motifs. In the last part of the article, I will introduce another axiom,
so as to honor my promise that I give and outline answers to our
larger questions. We now discuss &dquo;axiomatization versus mathemat-
ization,&dquo; which may also serve as an analogy to &dquo;software versus
hardware.&dquo;
Under the topic of &dquo;Mathematics and Science in China and the
West,&dquo; Needham (1959: 154) stresses the emergence of modern
science as a result of the mathematization of natural study in which
Galileo occupied a central position. Galileo is contrasted with a long
list of practitioners of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, among
whom Leonardo da Vinci was the most outstanding. Needham thinks
that Pledge hits the target when he says that in spite of Leonardo’s
deep insight into the nature and brilliance in experimentation, no
significant development followed because of his lack of mathematics.
Yet four pages later, Needham (1959: 158) also said that Strong
had convincingly shown that before Galileo, and during his lifetime,
mathematics was increasingly utilized by the practical technicians and
artisans of whom we have already spoken. Some of these, such as
Nicolo Tartaglia and Simon Stevin, were among the best mathemati-
cians of their time.
395
Needham insists that a crucial step toward scientific progress was
made by Galileo, and not by any of the previous practioners. Why
Galileo? Because of his mathematics? (In fact, compared with Kepler,
Descartes, and Newton, Galileo was obviously the least
mathematical.) But his predecessors (after Leonardo, but before him)
also had mathematics. As a result, we readers are left in a logical
quandary. In order to resolve this quandary, I think we ought to be
aware that &dquo;mathematization&dquo; was not the true &dquo;magic touch&dquo;
(Needham, 1959: 154), but axiomatization was. Galileo and Tartaglia
both did mathematization, but one did it in the realm of basic physical
science, the other in the realm of technology. The operations of look-
ing for measurables and hypothesizing their relations might be ex-
ecuted either on the level of basic phenomena, or on a derivative level.
Science works on basic phenomena and arrives at conclusions which
are universally valid but which may be remote from practical applica-
tions. That was the type of work Galileo and Kepler accomplished.
They performed their respective axiomatizations, while Newton ax-
iomatized both of theirs.
Since basic physical relations are quantitative, successful ax-
iomatization necessarily implies mathematization. Galileo was very
aware of this. He wrote that &dquo;philosophy&dquo; is written in mathematical
terms and symbols. His younger contemporary Descartes was also
very aware of this when he said he would take &dquo;god&dquo; and &dquo;the
mathematical order of nature&dquo; as synonyms. Mathematized
disciplines impress people with their accuracy and exactness. Yet an
advanced axiomatization possesses even greater intellectual appeal.
Newton’s synthesis, of course, was well equipped with both exactness
and comprehensiveness, which, in turn, impressed eighteenth-century
philosophers and thus contributed conspicuously to the general pro-
gress of history. Science did not directly contribute to engineering
technologies until about a century and a half after the publication of
the Principia. But indirectly, the contribution of the Scientific Revolu-
tion-owing to a positive attitude toward intellectualism and ra-
tionality-was continuous and considerable.
The growth of modern science as a whole does not depend ex-
clusively upon mathematization. At present, science as a whole is far
from being totally mathematized, and will perhaps never be so.
William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of blood formed a part
of the Scientific Revolution of Galileo’s time, yet it was not &dquo;written
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in the language of mathematics.&dquo; But human intellect always tacitly
accepts one fundamental assumption: other than seeking causal inter-
connections, explanation means accounting for a wide range of
phenomena with a limited number of elements. The Yin and Yang, or
the Five Elements, tried to work this way. They were the earliest in-
stances of a physical synthesis in China. Nevertheless, in the subse-
quent long centuries of Chinese history, we seldom find the dimmest
consciousness of scientific axiomatization. The first important case
that comes to mind is the nonacceptance of Euclidean geometry.
Needham ( 1959: 105-106) has a succinct history of importing Euclid’s
Elements into China. About the probable thirteenth-century intro-
duction, Needham writes:
The evidence does not absolutely indicate that the books in question
were a translation of Euclid into Chinese, though it seems probable that
they were. In any case they had no perceptible effect, and during the
following centuries the survey geometers, such as Tang Shunzhi and
Zhou Shu-xue in the + 16th century, continued quite naturally to follow
the ways of their predecessors in the Tang and before.
After that, this great model of mathematical axiomatization was in-
troduced (probably for the first time) in 1607 (the first six books), then
in 1857, and 1865. Interestingly enough the last introduction was
sponsored by the most prominent Confucian official of the time, Zen
Guo-fan. It is conceivable indeed that as late as the 1860s, Zen Guo-
fan might recommend Euclid, as he had done for the establishment of
shipyards and arsenals. But he would never suggest the abolition of
the examination system, which occurred 40 years later in 1905, after
the humiliating Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the tragic 1898 Reform,
and the disastrous Boxers’ Rebellion in 1900. Zen Guo-fan’s
politicoideological stand could never surpass &dquo;Zhong-xue wei ti, Xi-
xue wei yong-Chinese learning is our substance; take Western learn-
ing as applications.&dquo;
For more than twenty centuries, the leading Chinese proto-
scientific methodology was the so-called correlativism, which lacks ex-
act logic, causal analysis, and physical explanations; whereas it em-
phasizes analogies, of which many were so remote and irrelevant that
superstition is the only fitting name for them.
With regard to ancient explanations of earthquakes, Needham’s
section on seismology (1959: 624-625) contains a revealing comparison
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between an ancient Chinese theory and ancient Greek theories. The
Chinese theory, which is described in the Shi Ji (Records of a
Historian ending in 99 B.C.), says
The dynasty of the Zhou is going to perish ... When the Yang is hidden
and cannot come forth, or when the Yin bars its way and it cannot rise
up, then there is what we call an earthquake. Now we see that the three
rivers have dried up by this shaking; it is because the Yang has lost its
place and the Yin has overburdened it. When the Yang has lost its rank
and finds itself (subordinate to) the Yin, the springs become closed, and
when this has happened the kingdom must be lost.
After this quote from the Shi Ji, Needham describes the continuous
development of the theory of &dquo;the imprisoned Yang&dquo; until the Song
Dynasty, as late as the end of the thirteenth century-and it might
have persisted even longer. About ancient Greek theories Needham
(1959: 625) uses Lone’s summary:
Anaxagoras believed that earthquakes were caused by excess of water
from the upper regions bursting into the under parts and hollows of the
earth; Democritus thought that this happened when the earth was
already saturated with water, and Anaximenes suggested that the shocks
were caused by masses of earth falling in cavernous places during the
processes of drying. Aristotle himself in the 4th century attributed the
instability to the vapour generated by the drying action of the sun on the
moist earth, and to difficulties met with by the vapour in escaping.
Although Needham reminds his readers that Chinese theories were no
more primitive than those the ancient Mediterranean world entertain-
ed on the subject of earthquakes, we could hardly help noticing two
striking differences between the two sides. One is the strong political
association in the Chinese natural theory. Consequently it acquires an
authoritativeness that intends to compel people to accept their
political conclusions. (Is this one of the keys to understanding the
characteristic non sequitur in Chinese reasoning?) Another problem
about the Chinese theory is the undefined &dquo;Yin and Yang.&dquo; Looking
at the terse summary of Greek theories, one admires by contrast their
unadulterated naturalism: &dquo;excess of water,&dquo; &dquo;saturated with
water,&dquo; &dquo;masses of earth,&dquo; or &dquo;the vapour generated by the drying
action of the sun.&dquo;
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I am aware of the long survival of such erroneous concepts as
&dquo;phlogiston&dquo; and &dquo;ether&dquo; in Western scientific development. But
they differ saliently from the Yin and Yang, because their physical and
chemical functions and characteristics were well hypothesized. In the
eighteenth century the &dquo;phlogiston,&dquo; and as late as the beginning of
this century the &dquo;ether,&dquo; both played their parts in hectic times of ex-
perimental and argumentative sciences. When science pushed them
out of its realm, as if by Newtonian reaction, they pushed science
ahead. In China, the Yin and Yang appeared early, and were backed
by political as well as intellectual authority. As if mired in a vicious
circle, Chinese science could not expel them, hence could not make the
necessary breakthrough.
The endurance of the idea of Yin and Yang ushers us into a debate
on the scientific basis of scientific philosophies. Needham was describ-
ed by some historians as an &dquo;organic philosopher&dquo; (Nakayama,
1973b), who saw &dquo;in Whiteheadian organismic philosophy the syn-
thesis of mechanism and vitalism.&dquo; According to the same author,
Needham has a strong antipathy to the mechanistic view that
characterizes many physical scientists, and he is inclined to synthesis
over analysis. This is a useful link for us to understand why Needham
found so much congeniality and merit in Chinese proto-scientific
thinking. He has written numerous passages that state that the
bureaucratic society of ancient and medieval China produced the
philosophy of organism, which is according to him (as we have quoted
before), valuable for the future history of human thought, or (to add
one more quotation), which &dquo;may turn out to have been as necessary
an element in the formation of the perfected world view of natural
science&dquo; (Needham, 1956: 339). Yet herein Needham himself perceiv-
ed a big irony (1956: 340):
The gigantic historical paradox remains that although Chinese civiliza-
tion could not spontaneously produce &dquo;modem&dquo; natural science,
natural science would not perfect itself without the characteristic
philosophy of Chinese civilization.
I, however, am very skeptical about this vision, which presents itself
as a complete irony to continuity in scientific and philosophical pro-
gress. And on this issue Nakayama (1973b: 25) was as doubtful as I
am:
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However, it is very doubtful that &dquo;organism&dquo; in its Chinese version
could ever take the role of a promoter of modern science. Some of the
very characteristics of organism that Needham considered uniquely
Chinese might be found in other premodern cultures too.
Moreover, the physical, mathematical, and biological basis of
Needham’s organicist philosophy is very shaky. I cannot with full con-
fidence evaluate his &dquo;endocrine orchestra&dquo; or &dquo;reticulate continuum&dquo;
biology, but physics helps me to look at the situation from a vantage
point, because physics has so far not only circumscribed but also
penetrated biology successfully. If we have confidence in a unified
philosophy about a unified universe which contains an extremely
small and thin wafer of living phenomena, then what is true physically
should be true throughout. Needham’s misunderstanding of physics
can be summarized this way: (1) He believes that Newtonian billiard-
ball physics is scientifically wrong and historically unnecessary-as we
have mentioned before; (2) correspondingly he believes that field
physics replaces billiard-ball physics, and they contradict each other;
(3) he believes that the relativistic concept of time supports his
&dquo;timeless pattern&dquo; (specifically, he misunderstands the absolute con-
clusion of cause-effect relationship of special relativity as relative); (4)
he separates geometry from algebra as methodologically-that is, on a
philosophical level-two distinctive fields.
As I have analyzed before, Needham’s idea is historically wrong,
because he believes that human knowledge could have avoided the
comprehension of mechanical phenomena as billiard-ball physics. It is
not hard either to point out that he is also scientifically wrong. Con-
ceptually, not only does field physics not contradict billiard-ball
physics, but it is also a natural extension and development of the lat-
ter ; a further confirmation of-to borrow Erwin Schrodinger’s phras-
ing-&dquo;a naive physicist’s comparatively simple and clear humble&dquo;
ideal of ponderable, tangible and causally conceivable physics. By the
way, quantum field physics does this job even better. Physically,
billiard-ball physics holds true not only in a cosmological universe, in
a human-size (or billiard-ball) universe, but also holds true in the
deepest attainable micro-universe (many orders deeper than all the in-
trinsic biochemical mechanisms of living phenomena)-at all levels at-
tainable by modern physical experimentation. One needs only to point
out this simple and beautiful fact: all the millions of photographic
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records of elementary particle interactions demonstrate without ex-
ception that elementary particles interact like billiard-balls-variable
billiard-balls subject to a set of conservation and nonconservation
laws.
As the last topic we return to the question of the basic factors that
made the &dquo;European miracle&dquo; possible and the basic impediments
that inhibited science in China. This article starts with a discussion of
the academic (or internal) aspect of science, which we term the scien-
tific character of science. We are going to end the article with a discus-
sion of the institutional aspect of science, which we may term the
social character of science. We have already seen that mechanical
science did not develop in China because some brilliant early observa-
tions on buoyancy and the lever were not carried over, examined, im-
proved, and generalized by followers.
As early as the Mohist Canon, China already possessed a series of
theorems on geometrical optics. But for more than a millenium after
that, there was a historiographical blackout on the subject. Shen Kua,
whom we mentioned before in relation to planetary astronomy, also
studied optical phenomena, ignorant of Mohist conclusions. In the
middle of the fourteenth century, Zhao You-qing carried out some
brilliant experiments to prove the rectilinear propagation of light and
to explain the image formed through a small hole, again unaware of
his predecessors, either the Mohists or Shen Kua. In the realm of
physical inquiry both the lack of professionalism and the lack of pro-
fessional inheritance are evident. But we may also raise a related ques-
tion : Does the lack of professional inheritance imply a lack of motiva-
tion to make deeper inquiries? Because traditional China did not pro-
vide the necessary intellectual zeal to sustain enduring systematic, ra-
tional, and causal inquiries about nature, we encounter repeated in-
stances where some topics were picked up by interested scholars but
then were subsequently disregarded. That is why Chinese geometrical
optics, and physics in general, could never proceed beyond several
elementary and imprecise statements.
In order to stay alive and vital, not only should science be carried
on by the best brains of a sizable community, generation after genera-
tion, but these brains should be sufficiently motivated to work hard;
to struggle against institutional hindrances and ideological limitations;
to make sacrifices; to devote their whole lives; and to overcome in-
tellectual biases and public prejudices. To take into account these fac-
tors, I have proposed another &dquo;axiom,&dquo; the principle of the degree of
401
intellectual activation and creativity. By the degree of activation we
mean that we are referring to social phenomena and trying to talk in
terms of statistical averages. As a criterion the primary concern of this
principle is to see to what extent had conducive historical factors ac-
tivated people’s creative and intellectual efforts. And to what extent
had these factors overcome inimical factors that would dampen the
emergence of modern science? This principle accentuates science as a
societal and multigenerational enterprise, modern science as an
organized component of general modernity, and an institutionalized
activity based on deep social consciousness and commitment. In my
formal formulation of the principle (Qian, 1983) I mentioned the ex-
tensive, intensive, pluralistic, and inheritable aspects of intellectual
activation, and I stated that the aim of activation is to promote con-
structive, innovative, explantory, and exploratory purposes. The early
history of science was overburdened with myths about scientific
wizards; in that type of history great scientists’ endeavors and
achievements were divorced from their socio-politial environment.
But the principle of social activation will certainly more than remedy
that drawback.
Even a perfunctory study of Western history of science impresses
one with remarkably high (&dquo;degree&dquo; of) interest in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries in natural, mathematical, and technological sub-
jects. Pending a systematic study, let me just use one brief, &dquo;old,&dquo;
and excellent work, Science and Social Welfare in the Age of Newton
(Clark, 1949). In the first dozen pages, Clark mentions the following
scientific and technological publications: P. Virgil, De inventoribus
rerum (1505, Paris; an abridgement in English was published in 1546);
Ramus, Scholae Mathematicae (1569, Basel); F. Bacon’s great works
in the early seventeenth century; John Wilkins, Mathematical Magic
(1648); Edward Somerset, Century of Invention (1663); and Sprate,
History of the Royal Society (1667). Clark tells us that Somerset was
not the only English nobleman who hired scientists and had his
laboratory; the second Duke of Buckingham, King Charles himself,
and Prince Rupert did the same.
With this backdrop, which may well be many times expanded, the
contemporaneous famous accomplishment of Copernicus, Tycho
Brahe, Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey, and Newton, the formation
of the first scientific societies, and the appearance of the first scientific
journals-in short, the phenomenon of the Scientific Revolu-
tion-become more sensible.
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As a sharp contrast, when in Ming China Song Ying-xing finished
writing in 1636 a homely and pictorial book on ordinary productive
technologies, he was painfully aware of the unmarketability of his
brainchild. On this score, of course, we can also recall the abortive in-
troduction of Euclidean geometry into China.
With this contrast we can understand how surprising it was when
Chinese readers were recently taught by an American professor that
there occurred a &dquo;scientific revolution&dquo; in seventeenth-century China.
Indeed I think we really need to emphasize a &dquo;Tolstoyan principle of
historical commensurateness.&dquo; I term it this way, because according
to what I know this principle is Leo Tolstoy’s invention; and as a
guide to historical scholarship, again according to what I know, it is
Geoffrey Parker’s discovery (1972: ix). In Tolstoy’s War and Peace,
three peasants argued about what makes a locomotive move.
Metaphorically the silly argument illustrates an important prin-
ciple-to use Tolstoy’s own formulation:
The only conception capable of explaining the movement of the
locomotive is that of a force commensurate with the movement observ-
ed. The only conception capable of explaining the movement of peoples
is that of some force commensurate with the whole movement of the
peoples.
Yet to supply this conception various historians assume forces of entire-
ly different kinds, all of which are incommensurate with the movement
observed.
A historian who neglects this Tolstoyan principle is analogous to a
physicist who forgets the law of energy conservation.
According to my knowledge the word &dquo;revolution&dquo; is generally
reserved for historic-social changes of gigantic scale and momentous
consequences-for example, the veritable &dquo;price revolution&dquo; in
sixteenth-century Europe. Therefore, I would apply &dquo;revolution&dquo; to
corresponding events and try to correlate them to commensurate
causes and effects.
What can the combination of the two proposed &dquo;axioms&dquo;-&dquo;soft-
ware decides&dquo; and &dquo;degree of activation&dquo; counts-tell us? In China,
the decisive &dquo;software&dquo; that reduced the &dquo;degree of modernity activa-
tion&dquo; was traditional China’s politico-ideological institution-a
unified institution that dominated a densely populated and basically
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rural and vast territory. About the institution itself let me quote John
K. Fairbank (1979: 392):
This unitary system [the fusion of morality and politics] has worked in
the People’s Republic as under imperial Confucianism because moral-
ideological authority and political power have been combined at the
top.
My educated guess is that each of the few scholars who have recogniz-
ed the significance of this decisive &dquo;software&dquo; has a Sino-Western
comparative perspective at the back of his or her mind. I will borrow a
passage from William Monter, my advisor, to explain this com-
parative perspective. Writing about my work, he expresses my idea
with such superb elegance:
If Qian is correct in his assumption that &dquo;software decides,&dquo; then exact-
ly what types of non-scientific &dquo;software&dquo; accompanied, facilitated, or
at any rate failed to prevent the emergence of a recognizably &dquo;modern&dquo;
science by the time of Newton? Cultural pluralism, says Qian. Consider-
ing that the human mass of China and Europe (including Western
Russia) approximately balanced each other, the most important contrast
he sees is between the politically and culturally unified Chinese empire,
held together by a Confucian ideology administered by a bureaucracy
equipped with a superb rote memory of classical texts-and the multiple
divisions of Europe, where the loyalties of intellectuals were split be-
tween church and state, between state and state, and (after Luther) be-
tween church and church. In China a capricious, free-will &dquo;Son of
Heaven&dquo; presided over an irregular natural world, but human affairs
were usually well-ordered; in Christendom, a watchmaker-God-
regulated Nature while human affairs swirled in a disorderly cauldron.
It was the Confucian ideal that human affairs be well-ordered under a
&dquo;Son of Heaven,&dquo; but the long history of traditional China has been
characterized by a basic Chinese dichotomy: sociopolitical instability
within ideologic-institutional continuity. The uniquely Chinese
&dquo;dynastic cycles&dquo; with a relatively short average period witness the
dichotomy.
For about a century and some more, China has been in a 
&dquo; transla-
tion movement.&dquo; This is literally true in scientific and cultural mat-
ters, even to a considerable extent in various forms of official
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ideology, whose major representatives are Hong Xiu-quan, Sun Yat-
sen, Mao Ze-dong, and Deng Xiao-ping. (As it can be seen, my
macrohistorical evaluation is at the antipodes from either the stand
that backs the concept of the &dquo;ecumenical science&dquo; or the one that
proclaims that a &dquo;scientific revolution&dquo; occurred in seventeenth-
century China.) But this Chinese translation movement differs
remarkably from the one in medieval Europe, when European
schoolmen translated proto-sciences and other classics. In a few cen-
turies Western creativity surpassed the ancient originals and forged
ahead (the fourteenth century was a scientific height). If China-with
about one-fourth of the world population-wants to catch up with the
West and forge ahead, it is vital to pay foremost (indeed, for many
Chinese, painful) attention to &dquo;software&dquo; reformation, thus raising
the degree of intellectual activation in a genuine, all-around, and en-
during manner.
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